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PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT IN
ENGLAND: The Mareva Injunction
I. INTRODUCTION
Compared to some of her European neighbors, England was
slow to adopt a principle of prejudgment attachment. In France, for
example, the process of saisie conservatoire has existed for many
years. The words literally mean a "conservative seizure" or a
"seizure of assets so as to conserve them for the creditor in case he
should afterwards get judgment."' In Scotland the law of arrest-
ment achieves basically the same purpose. 2 In England, however, a
creditor could not reach a debtor's assets until the court had entered
judgment.3 The case often cited in support of this principle is Lister
& Co. v. Stubbs, in which Cotton, L.J., stated:
I know of no case where, because it was highly probable that if
the action were brought to a hearing the plaintiff could establish
that a debt was due to him from the defendant, the defendant has
been ordered to give security until that has been established by
the judgment or decree.
4
In 1975, the English courts created the Mareva injunction to
afford some prejudgment protection to creditors. 5 Although this
new procedure seemed irreconcilable with Lister, the court did not
expressly overrule Lister. Attempts have been made to reconcile the
two principles by establishing one as the rule and the other as the
exception to it.6 The continuing vitality of Lister has, nevertheless,
inhibited the development of the Mareva injunction. It is against
this background that an overview of the Mareva injunction is
presented.
Part II describes the nature and scope of the Mareva injunction.
1. A. DEN14ING, THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 133 (1980).
2. R.J. WALKER, PRINCIPLES OF SCOTTISH PRIVATE LAW 163-64 (2d ed. 1975) cited in
Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA, [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 657 (C.A.).
3. Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera SA, 1979 A.C. 210, 259-60.
4. 45 Ch. D. 1, 13 (1890).
5. Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. Int'l Bulkcarriers SA, [1980] 1 All E.R. 213
(C.A.).
6. Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1259, 1266 (Ch.) (suggesting that Lister
be the rule and Mareva the exception). But see infra text accompanying note 73 (suggesting
the contrary view that Mareva be the rule).
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Part III explains why England was ripe for the Mareva injunction.
A chronology of case law which illustrates the emerging principles
follows. Part IV focuses on the application of these principles as
they relate to jurisdiction, the balance of convenience, the nature of
the assets involved, and the parties affected.
II. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROCEDURE
The Mareva injunction does not convert an unsecured creditor
into a partially secured creditor by creating proprietary rights in a
debtor's assets, nor does it give a creditor priority in insolvency pro-
ceedings. Instead, the Mareva injunction operates in personam to
restrain a debtor from dealing with his or her assets until the court
enters judgment.7 Until then, a creditor has no rights in a debtor's
assets. For this reason, the Mareva injunction cannot strictly be
called a prejudgment attachment. 8
The Mareva injunction is granted in most cases as a form of
interlocutory relief.9 The court, however, may continue the injunc-
tion to facilitate execution of the judgment so that plaintiff can have
the protection when he or she needs it most.'0 On the other hand,
the court may discharge the injunction, especially in insolvency
cases, where a creditor might get rights he or she otherwise would
not have. I
The scope of the Mareva injunction is not limited to commer-
cial debts. The injunction may support a claim for personal inju-
ries.' 2 It has also been used in the following situations: to
supplement other remedies,' 3 to obtain security in arbitration
cases,' 4 and to act as a discovery device. 15 With respect to discov-
ery, plaintiff may not conduct a "fishing expedition" for defendant's
assets, but plaintiff does have the right to ascertain the whereabouts
7. Rose, The Mareva injunction-attachment in personam-Part 1, 1981 LLOYD'S MAR.
& CoM. L.Q. 1, 5 [hereinafter cited as I Rose].
8. Wood, Protective Measures for Recovering Debts in England and Wales, 2 INT'L
CONT. L. & FIN. REv. 458, 463 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Wood].
9. Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 49, sec.
45; see also 24 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND Para. 917 (4th ed. 1979).
10. Rose, The Mareva injunction-attachment in personam-Part 2, 1981 LLOYD'S
MAR. & COM. L.Q. 177, 186 [hereinafter cited as 2 Rose].
11. Wood, supra note 8, at 463.
12. Allen v. Jambo Holdings Ltd., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1252, 1256 (C.A.).
13. 2 Rose, supra note 10, at 184-85.
14. See, e.g., The Rena K, [1979] 1 Q.B. 377, 378-79.
15. See, e.g., A. v. C., [1981] 1 Q.B. 956; A. v. C. (No. 2), [1981] 1 Q.B. 961.
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of such assets after he or she has narrowed their location down to
either one or two bank accounts.16
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW PROCEDURE
A. Background
The measures traditionally used for the recovery of commercial
debts 7 were not as efficient as the means by which debtors could
transfer their assets out of the reach of creditors.18 The courts saw a
need to provide a means by which creditors could effectively prevent
such transfers, and thus preserve a debtor's assets for satisfaction of
the judgment. The courts created the Mareva injunction to meet
this need.
The courts initially invoked this procedure in claims against
foreign ship charterers who defaulted on the hire. The plaintiffs,
usually shipowners, found the English courts to be a "fruitful
venue" to litigate their claims' 9 since the court often had jurisdiction
by virtue of London arbitration 20 or insurance 2l provisions in the
charterparties (charter agreements). Upon the charterer's default,
the shipowner's main concern was to locate the charterer's assets in
order to secretly prevent their removal from England. The Mareva
injunction by allowing exparte applications succeeds in providing
secrecy. This relatively simple procedure has proved very popular
with the commercial community, and by 1980, more than 20 appli-
cations a month were being filed.22
B. Development by Case Law
The Court of Appeal created the Mareva injunction in 1975 in
the case of Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis.23 This case, accord-
ing to Lord Denning, touched off the greatest piece of law reform in
his time.24 In this case, plaintiff Japanese shipowners had entered
into a charterparty with defendants, the Karageorgis brothers. De-
16. Id
17. Eg., Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, sec. 44; Companies Act, 1948, 11
& 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, sec. 320; and Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, Order 14 (1981).
18. Rasu Maritima SA v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara,
[1978] 1 Q.B. 644, 661 (C.A.) [hereinafter cited as Pertamina].
19. Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera SA, 1979 A.C. 210, 216.
20. Eg., The Rena K, [1979] 1 Q.B. 377, 386.
21. Eg., Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera SA, 1979 A.C. 210, 227.
22. Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA, [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 650 (C.A.).
23. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093 (C.A.).
24. A. DENNING, supra note 1, at 134.
19821
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fendants defaulted on the hire and disappeared, but plaintiff was
able to locate funds of defendants in a London bank. There was a
risk, however, that defendants would remove the funds by tele-
graphic transfer. Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, said, "We are
told that an injunction of this kind has never been granted before. It
has never been the practice of the English courts to seize assets of a
defendant in advance of judgment or to restrain the disposal of
them." 25 It was time, his lordship decided, to revise such a practice.
The court held:
There is no reason why the High Court or this court should not
make an order such as is asked for here. It is warranted by sec-
tion 45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act,
1925 which says that the High Court may grant a mandamus or
injunction or appoint a receiver by interlocutory order in all cases
in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient so to do.
It seems to me that this is just such a case. Theie is a strong
prima facie case that the hire is owing and unpaid. If an injunc-
tion is not granted, these moneys may be removed out of the ju-
risdiction and the shipowners will have the greatest difficulty in
recovering anything. Two days ago we granted an injunction ex
parte and we should continue it.26
Lord Denning was so pleased with his decision that he said,
"There was no need to wait for the case to be reported. I am quite
sure by that afternoon every commercial set of chambers in The
Temple buzzed with it.''27 The legal profession quickly recognized
the potential of the Nippon Yusen decision. Barely a month later the
Court of Appeal in Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. International
Bulkcarriers SA 28 again utilized the new procedure and gave it its
name.29
Both Nippon Yusen and Mareva were exparte injunctions. In
neither case did defendants apply to discharge the injunctions so
that only the creditors' side was heard. For the authority to be com-
plete, both sides needed to be heard. Such a case finally came up
25. Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093, 1094 (C.A.).
26. Id. at 1095.
27. A. DENNING, supra note 1, at 135.
28. [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (C.A.).
29. Sir Robert Megarry, V.C., believes that the name Mareva has been given to the
injunction because the Nippon Yusen court had not been referred to Lister or any of the
other cases in that line, and it was in the Mareva case that the Court of Appeal held that the
injunction should be granted notwithstanding authorities to the contrary. Barclay-Johnson
v. Yuill, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1259, 1262 (Ch.).
[Vol. 5
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two years later in Rasu Maritima SA v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara,30 mercifully short-titled
Pertamina .3
Plaintiff shipowner sued defendant charterer for damages of
nearly £2,000,000 for breach of a charterparty. After numerous fu-
tile attempts in several countries to attach defendant's assets, plain-
tiff finally found some equipment purportedly belonging to
defendant waiting to be shipped from Liverpool. Plaintiff immedi-
ately applied exparte for an injunction to restrain the shipping of
the equipment, and the defendant applied to discharge the order.
The Court of Appeal discharged the injunction on two grounds.
32
First, there was a serious question as to whether defendant held
valid title to the equipment. Second, the value of the equipment to
defendant (it was to be used as part of a proposed plant) far out-
weighed its value to plaintiff if seized and sold under execution of
judgment. The court would issue an injunction only if it were "just
or convenient" to do so,33 and since it had grave doubts as to the
merits of plaintiff's case,34 the court did not continue the injunction.
Lord Denning, who took part in this decision said later:
IT]hat decision was a good way of getting things done. By our
words we did much to establish the Mareva injunction as a new
principle-but by our decision we avoided any appeal to the
House of Lords. We decided on the merits in favour of the de-
fendants--thus precluding any appeal by them: but we made it
clear that that new principle was to be available in future in Eng-
lish law.35
His lordship's satisfaction was short-lived, however, as two
months later the House of Lords not only reviewed the Mareva in-
junction but reversed an application of it in Siskina v. Distos Compa-
nia Naviera S4.36 The pertinent facts were as follows: plaintiff
30. [19781 1 Q.B. 644 (C.A.).
31. Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1259, 1263 (Ch.).
32. Lord Denning said:
[These questions] must be taken into account considering whether discretion
should be exercised or not. . . . While [these questions remain] unanswered, the
situation is such that I do not think it would be proper in this case for equity to
intervene to assist one side or the other. I am tempted to say, "A plague on both
your houses."
Pertamina, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 662-63.
33. Id at 659-60.
34. See supra text accompanying note 32.
35. A. DENNING, supra note 1, at 140.
36. 1979 A.C. 210.
1982]
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cargo owners had a substantial claim against defendant shipowners
arising out the shipowners' failure to complete delivery of freight-
prepaid goods, for wrongfully diverting the vessel, and for discharg-
ing the cargo under an unwarranted claim of lien. The shipowners
owned only one ship, the Siskina, which had sunk. Their only asset
was the insurance money due to them from London underwriters
for the loss of the ship. The cargo owners wanted to keep the insur-
ance proceeds in England until they could litigate their damage
claims in Cyprus. The High Court granted an injunction, and the
Court of Appeal upheld it. The case then went to the House of
Lords, which reversed on the narrow ground that the Mareva in-
junction could not be extended to provide a general power of attach-
ment where the court had no other basis of jurisdiction over
defendants other than plaintiffs' application for an interim
injunction.
37
In this decision, the House of Lords reviewed the Mareva prin-
ciple but did not challenge it.38 Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone
gaid, "Since the House is in no way casting doubt on the validity of
the new practice by its decision in the instant appeal, I do not wish
in any way to do so myself. . . -39 Lord Denning commented on
the House's silence two years later in Third Chandris Shipping Corp.
v. Unimarine SA ,4 "If the House had any doubts about our jurisdic-
tion in the matter, I should have expected them to give voice to
them, rather than let the legal profession continue in error. But
none of their Lordships did cast any doubt on it."'4 I The Mareva
injunction had become part of English jurisprudence.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION
.4. Jurisdiction
The source of the courts' Mfareva jurisdiction is found in sec-
tion 45(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act,
1925,42 which permits the High Court of Justice to grant an injunc-
tion "in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or conve-
nient so to do." The jurisdictional prerequisite is that there exist
37. Id at 217, 254-58.
38. Id at 254.
39. Id at 261.
40. [1979] 1 Q.B. at 645.
41. Id at 666.
42. Pertamina, [1978] 1 Q.B. 644, 659-60 (C.A.). Sec. 45(1) has recently been re-en-
acted as sec. 37(1) of The Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54.
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"an action, actual or potential, claiming substantial relief which the
High Court has jurisdiction to grant and to which the interlocutory
orders. . . are but ancillary." 43 The importance of this prerequisite
is illustrated in the Siskina case, where the House of Lords held that
there was no action or substantive claim before the High Court to
which the injunction sought could be ancillary.44 The court said:
All that [plaintiffs] have is a claim to monetary compensation
arising from a cause of action against the shipowners which is not
justiciable in the High Court without the shipowners' consent-
which they withhold. To argue that the claim to monetary com-
pensation is justiciable in the High Court because if it were justici-
able it would give rise to an ancillary right to a Mareva
injunction restraining the shipowners [from] doing something in
England pending adjudication of the monetary claim, appears to
me to involve the fallacy of petitio principii or, in the vernacular,
an attempt to pull oneself up by one's own bootstraps.45
Plaintiffs had attempted to bring their action into the English courts
by applying for leave to serve defendants overseas. Leave, however,
was granted only to plaintiffs who could meet certain requirements
governing overseas service of process. The pertinent court rule pro-
vided that leave might be granted "if in the action begun by writ an
injunction is sought ordering the defendant to do or refrain from
doing anything within the jurisdiction (whether or not damages are
also claimed in respect of a failure to do or the doing of the
thing)." 46 The only action brought in England by plaintiffs was the
application for a Mareva injunction, which, according to their Lord-
ships, did not constitute an action within the meaning of the rule. 47
Since the court had no in personam jurisdiction over defendants,
there was no action to which the application for a Mareva injunc-
tion could be ancillary, and, therefore, the court had no power to
grant an injunction.48
The restrictive holding of Siskina has been identified with the
Lister line of cases.49 However, an important distinction must be
43. Siskina v. Distos Naviera SA, 1979 A.C. 210, 254. See also Mareva Compania
Naviera SA v. Int'l Bulkcarriers SA, [1980] 1 All E.R. 213, 214 (C.A.) (an injunction will not
be granted to protect a person who has no legal or equitable right whatever).
44. Id at 253.
45. Id at 257.
46. Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, Order 11, Rule l(i) (1981).
47. Siskina v. Distos Naviera SA, 1979 A.C. 210, 253.
48. Id at 256.
49. Barclay-Johnson v. YuiU, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1259, 1262-63 (Ch.).
1982]
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made: the decision of the court not to issue an injunction in Siskina
turned on the lack of jurisdiction, while in Lister it did not. A closer
look at the facts of Lister will give a clearer picture of the situation.
In Lister, defendant agent had corruptly received commission
payments from a third party. The principals applied for an injunc-
tion to restrain the agent from dealing with the money received.
The Chancery Divisional Court held that since the commission was
not the property of the principals, they had no right to prevent the
agent from dealing with it.50 The court did not address the issue of
personal jurisdiction since the agent was actually in England.
Rather, the court denied the injunction as a matter of practice:5'
[11f the money sought to be recovered is not the money of the
Plaintiffs, we should be simply ordering the Defendant to pay
into court a sum of money in his possession because there is a
primafacie case against him that at the hearing it will be estab-
lished that he owes the money to the Plaintiffs. In my opinion,
that would be. . . introducing an entirely new and wrong princi-
ple-which we ought not to do. .... 52
The difference between jurisdiction and practice is important
because it diminishes the precedential value of Lister. While courts
are not free to extend jurisdiction where there is none, they are free
to depart from practice whenever it seems just or convenient to do
so.
5 3
B. Balance of Convenience
Section 45(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolida-
tion) Act, 1925, permits the courts to grant interlocutory injunctions
in cases where it is "just or convenient" to do so. The general prin-
ciples for interlocutory injunctions are set out in the oft-cited Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd 54 The threshhold requirement is
that there be a serious question to be tried.5 5 The court must be
satisfied that plaintiff's claim is not merely vexatious.5 6 The court
also takes into consideration the uncompensable disadvantages to
50. Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, 45 Ch. D. 1, 13 (1890).
51. See Mareva Compania SA v. Int'l Bulkcarriers SA, [1980] 1 All E.R. 213, 215
(C.A.).
52. Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, 45 Ch. D. 1, 14 (1890).
53. See 2 Rose, supra note 10, at 194.
54. 1975 A.C. 396.




each party should it grant or discharge an injunction.57 In Mareva
cases the courts have tended to vary the principles of American
Cyanamid.5 8
With respect to the "vexatious" test,59 for example, the Court of
Appeal has held that a "good, arguable" case is sufficient to invoke
the Mareva doctrine.60 The requirements for a "good, arguable"
case have been set out in Third Chandris.
61
First, plaintiff must fully disclose material facts concerning the
case. In this connection he or she must give all particulars of the
claim, including the size of the claim and the grounds for it.62 Plain-
tiff may also be required to reply to any bona fide defenses made by
defendant in his or her application to discharge.
63
Second, plaintiff must show that defendant has assets in Eng-
land. The existence of a bank account is sufficient.64
Third, plaintiff must show that there is a risk that defendant
would remove his or her assets before the judgment is satisfied.65
The risk of removal or disposal of assets is the core of the Mareva
injunction. Indeed, it has been said that the risk factor distinguishes
Mareva from Lister.66 In commercial cases it is sufficient if there
are facts "from which the Commercial Court, like a prudent, sensi-
ble commercial man, can properly infer a danger of default if assets
are removed from the jurisdiction."
67
Fourth, plaintiff must give an undertaking in case his or her
claim fails or if the injunction turns out to be unjustified.68 The rule
is that plaintiff will only get such security in return as he or she has
been required to furnish.69 On the question of security, one com-
mentator has noted:
Not only would the general principle in Lister v. Stubbs be
doubly circumvented if the Mareva procedure were used specifi-
57. Id
58. See Fellowes & Son v. Fisher, [1976] 1 Q.B. 122, 133 (C.A.).
59. See R.J. WALKER, supra note 55, at 258.
60. Pertamina, [1978] 1 Q.B. 644, 661 (C.A.).
61. Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA, [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 668-69 (C.A.).
62. Id
63. Meisel, The Mareva Injunetion-Recent Developments, 1980 LLOYD'S MAR. &
COM. L.Q. 38, 14.
64. Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA, [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 668 (C.A.).
65. Id at 669.
66. 2 Rose, supra note 10, at 194.
67. Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA, [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 671 (C.A.).
68. Id at 669.
69. R.J. WALKER, supra note 55 at 256.
1982]
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cally for the purpose of requiring the defendant to put security,
albeit the consequences of actually doing so may be unavoidable,
but the procedure itself would be narrowed if it were in some way
confined to cases where the defendant were able to obtain some
security. This, fortunately, is unlikely, and of course, a defend-
ant's inability to obtain security may well prove the wisdom of
granting the injunction in the first place. It remains for Parlia-
ment to consider, however, whether the procedure should be
extended to provide the plaintiff with real security for, as will be
seen, the procedure in principle creates not interest in the assets
in question and so may afford minimal protection where the de-
fendant and anyone in possession of them are prepared to risk
being in contempt of court and to disappear out of the jurisdic-
tion with the assets.
70
A conflict exists because Lister denies to plaintiff a general
means of obtaining security from defendant before judgment. Yet
Mareva prevents defendant from dealing with his or her assets
before judgment. To avoid this conflict, Mareva decisions have os-
tensibly emphasized the "risk of removal" aspect. The fact that as-
sets were less easily transferable in the 19th century may explain
why the risk factor, so crucial in Mareva, was not significant in
Lister. In fact, some suggestions have been made that the two prin-
ciples may be reconcilable. In Barclay-Johnson v. Yuifl, 71 Sir Robert
Megarry, V.C., said:
I think that [the defendant] should be able to rely on the Lister
principle except so far as it cannot be reconciled with the needs of
the Mareva doctrine. I would regard the Lister principle as re-
maining the rule, and the Mareva doctrine as constituting a lim-
ited exception to it.72
Since the Mareva principle does incorporate the concerns of
Lister, there is a strong argument in favor of establishing Mareva as
the rule:
The clearly and widely drawn words of the statute, the powerful
arguments in favour of the Mareva procedure, the fact that it
does notper se establish proprietary rights and the tenuous dis-
tinction between it and the Lister v. Stubbs principle (which can
survive as a factor relevant to discretion) all, it is submitted, pro-
vide ample justification for the House of Lords abolishing the
70. 2 Rose, supra note 10, at 183.
71. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1259 (Ch.).
72. Id. at 1266.
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distinction and favouring the expansion of the Mareva principle
as the general practice.
7 3
C. Assets Affected
The nature of defendant's assets is a major consideration in the
court's evaluation of whether it is just or convenient to grant an in-
junction. The most common asset subject to a Mareva injunction is
a bank account. The freezing of such an asset, however, may seri-
ously affect a defendant whose commercial survival depends on a
good cash flow. 74 An undertaking by plaintiff may not always be
sufficient indemnity for the loss which defendant might suffer.75
This has been an area of concern to the courts, and Lord Denning
has cautioned against the granting of an injunction over assets that
would bring defendant's business to a standstill.76
More recent examples of assets subject to a Mareva injunction
include money payable under a bank guarantee. In Intraco Ltd v.
Notis Shiping Corp. ,77 the Court of Appeals held that although it
generally would not grant an injunction to prevent a seller from de-
manding payment from a bank under its guarantee, it could impose
a Mareva injunction on the fruits of the guarantee once received by
the beneficiary. In Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Co.
SA,78 an intervenor was successful in seeking a variation on the
Mareva injunction to enable defendants to repay a loan. The
Queen's Bench Division held that since plaintiffs were not consid-
ered judgment creditors before judgment, defendants should be al-
lowed to repay a loan to intervenors.79 The loan had arisen in the
ordinary course of business, and in repaying the loan defendants
were not seeking to avoid their responsibilities to plaintiffs.
Immovables, such as real property, are not considered any less
suitable for a Mareva injunction. "The property lawyer's concern
with creation of novel interests in land should be groundless, for the
Mareva injunction is supposed to operate inpersonam and to create
no proprietary interest in or lien over assets."80
73. 2 Rose, supra note 10, at 194.
74. Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA, [1979] I Q.B. 645, 653-64 (C.A.).
75. Id
76. Pertamina, [1978] 1 Q.B. 644, 662 (C.A.).
77. [1981] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 256 (C.A.).
78. [19811 1 Q.B. 65.
79. Id at 73.
80. 1 Rose, supra note 7, at 15.
1982]
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D. Parties Affected
In Siskina the House of Lords left open the question of whether
a Mareva injunction could be used against an English defendant. 8'
Indeed, defendant's domicile, residence, or presence within the ju-
risdiction has played an important part in a court's determination as
to whether it will exercise its discretion in Mareva cases. In Gebr
Van Weelde Scheepvaart Kantoor v. Homeric Marine Services Ltd ,82
the Queen's Bench Division refused an injunction because defend-
ant was an English company.
The prevailing trend injunction, however, has been to apply the
Mareva injunction to English defendants. In dictum in Pertamina,
Lord Denning stated that the Lister prohibition was inapplicable to
defendants outside English jurisdiction. 83 In Chartered Bank v.
Daklouche,84 a Lebanese couple operated a business in Abu Dhabi
but had substantial contacts in England. The wife had bought a
house in Hampshire, and had £70,000 in an English book. The
couple's two daughters were being educated in England. The Court
of Appeals considered the couple "English-based" for the purposes
of a Mareva injunction and froze the wife's bank account.
Any doubt as to whether the procedure applied to an English
defendant was dispelled after Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill.85 In that
case, the plaintiff had obtained an ex parte injunction restraining
defendant, who was not a foreigner, from removing certain assets
from the jurisdiction. The court reasoned that if the risk of removal
of assets was the core of the Mareva injunction, then the procedure
should not be confined to foreign defendants.8 6
Finally, in Kirby v. Banks,87 the Court of Appeal issued an in-
junction against an English defendant who was both a resident of
and present within the jurisdiction. The risk factor has replaced de-
fendant's nationality as a test for whether the Mareva injunction
should issue.
With respect to the rights and liabilities of third parties in a
81. This question was recently resolved by the codification of the Mareva injunction.
The Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, sec. 37(3).
82. [1979] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 117, 120 (Q.B.).
83. Pertamina, [1978] 1 Q.B. 644, 659 (C.A.).
84. 1 W.L.R. 107 (C.A.).
85. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1259 (Ch.).
86. Id at 1264.
87. 1978 K No. 976 (C.A. Jul. 1, 1980) (available Feb' 25, 1983, on LEXIS, Enggen
Library, Cases file), cited in 1 Rose, supra note 7, at 10.
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Mareva injunction, the Queen's Bench Division has recently held
that an injunction may issue against third parties if there is a risk of
removal or disposal of assets by the third parties in collaboration
with defendant.88
Finally, in Clipper Maritime Co. Ltd v. Mineralimportexport,89
the Queen's Bench Division considered the possible adverse effect
an exparte injunction might have on innocent third parties not rep-
resented in the action. In this case, lawyers for the port authority
where the arrested vessel was docked told the court that the injunc-
tion would affect the port's activities. As a result, plaintiffs were
required to give an undertaking to reimburse the port's lost income
and administrative costs attributable to the injunction.
V. SUMMARY OF ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES
In the seven years since the first Mareva cases were decided, the
English courts have developed consistent rules which carefully bal-
ance the interests of the parties involved. It may be helpful to sum-
marize the basic elements of the Mareva injunction as discussed in
the preceding sections.
Jurisdiction for the procedure is derived from section 45(1) of
the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925,90 which
gives the High Court wide discretion in granting interlocutory in-
junctions. This section was recently re-enacted with no substantial
changes as section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981.91 The
injunction sought must be part of plaintiff's substantive claim for
relief. If defendant is not present within the jurisdiction, plaintiff
must comply with the rules governing overseas service of process.
The two most important factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether it is "just or convenient" for the court to exercise its
discretion are the strength of plaintiff's case92 and the balance of
convenience to both parties.93 Plaintiff must show that he or she has
a "good, arguable case." 94 If plaintiff passes this hurdle, the court
will then consider whether damages would be sufficient to compen-
sate either party for losses suffered in the action should either party
88. Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Co. SA, [19811 1 Q.B. 65.
89. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1259, 1262 (Ch.).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 43-53.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 54-68.
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prevail against the other.95 In this connection, plaintiffs interest in
freezing defendant's assets must outweigh defendant's interest in
preventing irreparable disruption of his or her commercial inter-
ests. 96 Plaintiffs burden of proof, apart from showing a good, argu-
able case, is to persuade the court that the defendant has assets in
the jurisdiction and that there is risk of their removal.
97
If defendant wishes to discharge the injunction, his or her bur-
den is to show that his or her business would be irreparably injured
or that he or she has given sufficient security to cover the debt
should the court enter judgment against defendant. 98 The court's
responsibility is to find where the balance of convenience lies. 99 In
this connection, the nature of the assets sought to be restrained is
considered only to the extent of its relative value to both parties and
the ease with which it could be removed from the jurisdiction. 1l°
With respect to persons affected by the Mareva injunction, both
foreign and English defendants may be affected insofar as the
threatened removal of assets is the crucial factor in determining
whether the injunction will be granted.'0l Finally, innocent third
parties adversely affected by such an injunction may apply to the
courts for relief. 0
2
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE MAREVA INJUNCTION
The Aareva procedure has recently been codified as section
37(1) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981, which contains the following
subsection:
The power of the High Court under subsection (1) to grant an
interlocutory injunction restraining a party to any proceedings
from removing from the jurisdiction of the High Court, or other-
wise dealing with, assets located within that jurisdiction shall be
exercisable in cases where that party is, as well as in cases where




96. See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 61-69.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 54-88.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 80-88.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
103. Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, sec. 37(1).
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This subsection apparently does no more than statutorily con-
firm the existence of the Mareva injunction, which could just as eas-
ily have been accomplished by Parliament's re-enactment of section
45. Thus, it has been suggested that
[ujnless Parliament is prepared to elaborate on the factors gov-
erning the exercise of the procedure (e.g. as to the degree of
strength displayed in the applicant's case), or to define or to alter
the circumstances in which the jurisdiction exists (e.g. by over-
turning The Siskina), it might best decide not to single out for
mention this particular area of the court's jurisdiction to grant
injunctions unless it is for some more positive purpose. The
courts can be trusted to develop the procedure any further if
necessary. 104
Lord Denning, smarting from the reversal of Siskina also com-
mented, "I hope that the Courts may of themselves develop their
own jurisdiction so as to be ahead of the Legislature. But they can-
not, of course, overrule the House of Lords in The Siskina-without
the help of Parliament."'' 0 5 Although Lord Denning has on several
occasions been rebuked by the House of Lords for usurping the leg-
islative function, 1°6much can be said for his brand of judicial activ-
ism. One view is that the courts, in exercising their wide discretion
in various unpredictable circumstances, are not creating new laws
but only new interpretations of established principles. 07 Whatever
the rationale, the Mareva injunction would never have come into
existence without judicial inventiveness, and it is in this same spirit
that the new procedure will flourish.
May Lee
104. 2 Rose, supra note 10, at 197.
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